Applications of game theory have long been used in transport researches, but they are not applied generally. Considering the scopes, infrastructure cost allocation between users or user groups looks like most exciting and useful area. Recently this question is one of the most important problems, which could not have been answered clearly and generally by different research workshops. European transport researches are regarding development of a fair and efficient cost calculating and allocating system as important aim. After enlarging the European Union several opportunities, but at the same time several tasks have been appeared on community level in transportation. However new community regulations, lacking financial sources, managing externality problems etc. are larger challenge for New Member Countries. Even for several years these transition countries have quite other circumstances and conditions, than Old Member Countries. Therefore adaptability of former research results shall be analysed and revised in this area. So thus the opportunity of using game theory based applications also has appeared, e.g. in Hungary. The current applied calculation methods do not satisfy the previously considered new criteria. The former methods raised many problem, they were neither fair nor efficient . Several studies analysed the situation of concession motorways in Hungary. These projects could not be compared with successful undertaking for the same reasons. The experiences of M1 and M5 motorway projects open up new vistas analysing and revising game theory based applications. In the framework of this research there are several games to be set up, which could be analysed. In the case of named concession motorways, the State, private investors and public actors were involved with numerous conflicts of beneficial interests and aims. One analysis could focus on the terms of this three-player game. In another aspect the different users and user groups were charged for infrastructure use to cover debt service, operation and maintenance costs, so they played the cost allocation game. This n-player game contains few coalitions with certain cooperation. However the current system cannot be sustained, because it is neither fair not efficient. The changes in Hungarian and European regulations, e.g. implementing road pricing, configuring electronic charging systems, put up for further requirements. An adequate cost calculating and allocating method can meet these requirements and could contribute to harmonisation of European calculation methods. Electronic charging system can solve the problem of applying customised, distance-related road pricing. The fair coverage and allocation of infrastructure costs are accentuated tasks on elements of TEN-T Corridors. This kind of application, harmonised with neighbour countries' researches, improves also the fair and efficient use of community sources. This research based on classification of the different type of games, e.g. cooperative and non-cooperative games, 2- person and n-person games, game with core and with empty core etc. It demonstrates the different cost allocation methods, e.g. proportional repartition, Shapley-value, Nucleolus etc. These solutions analyse the problems in some measure, but complexity infers uncertainty in results of method. One of the reasons of this research is selecting applicable method in the Hungarian context. Selected method could evaluate the former cost allocation solutions on named motorways. These results could be compared to other researches' results. Conclusions could be drawn from former and current cost allocation practices. This modelling needs adequate accounting of construction and maintenance costs on different network elements, defining vehicle categories where the costs should be allocated on. Based on current research's results an opportunity presents itself for elaborating and implementing a new, uniform, efficient cost allocation method on the whole domestic motorway network. For the covering abstract please see ITRD E135207.
Abstract