A cognitive–ecological approach to judgement biases is presented and substantiated by recent empirical evidence. Latent properties of the environment are not amenable to direct assessment but have to be inferred from empirical samples that provide the interface between cognition and the environment. The sampling process may draw on the external world or on internal memories. For systematic reasons (proximity, salience, and focus of attention), the resulting samples tend to be biased (selective, skewed, or conditional on information search strategies). Because people lack the metacognitive ability to understand and control for sampling constraints (predictor sampling, criterion sampling, selective-outcome sampling, etc.), the sampling biases carry over to subsequent judgements. Within this framework, alternative accounts are offered for a number of judgement biases, such as base-rate neglect, confirmation bias, illusory correlation, pseudocontingency, Simpson's paradox, outgroup devaluation, and pragmatic-confusion effects. (A)
Abstract