In most of the African countries, the very big majority of the contracts for road maintenance at present in execution, is the type "in same prices", the Company being paid according to the really executed quantities of works. This system is binding for several reasons: it implies the settling of an annual programming of works by the Administration, requiring a detailed knowledge of the network, based on frequent movements. Then, the Company executes received program, without any initiative which could contribute to a better result. Finally, roads in ground undergo damages in rainy season aggravated by the inferior quality of grounds supports. It is often impossible to foresee these damages exactly 12 months in advance, where from the lapsing of the program well before the term. These constraints brought certain financiers of whom the world Bank, to think about a new system for the road maintenance, to arrive at a better quality of roads, while freeing itself from aforesaid difficulties. These reflections led Chad to implement a contract in "Levels of Service", in which one asks a company to maintain a road network, in good pre-established conditions, and for the payment of a periodic fixed payment, defined by contract. In Chad and considering the specificity of the contract which applies to roads inground, the accent is put on the obligation of durability of the transit for the concerned axes. The levels of service retained for the experimental project were classified in four categories and concern.Initial organizations on certain sections which are defined in the contract and which allow the company to have after their realization, a healthy infrastructure to be maintained. 1 -Management and maintenance of axes, including the management of rainy barriers and the control of loads in the axle. On roads in ground, bad weather often causes disorders. The repair of these seasonal damages falls to the Company, until a certain dimension. Beyond, administration takes care of them -Urgent works which must be recognized as such by the boss of work to be feasible. In this only case, the payment for these " exceptional works " or "immediately" makes on the basis of a list of fixed same prices. The entrepreneur is paid on the basis of a monthly kilometric fixed price which takes into account the initial alteration work, as well as the management and the maintenance of axes. Only possible urgent works are paid to realized quantities. In case where certain limits are reached, daily penalties are applied on the fixed price until the re-establishment of the level of service. Tive service. This type of contract requires a new approach for the building supervision. A bigger part is granted to the empowerment of the Company, which has contractually the duty to set up an internal cell of auto-control, charged to hold the company informed permanently about the state of the network, and to control the Levels of Service herself. For this contract, a mission of control proceeds to checks. From the infringement of all the Levels of Service on the set of the maintained shelf space, the performances of the Mission of Control limit themselves to the periodic check of the respect for these Levels of Service. The Mission of control is free to test the state of the network when it wishes it. However, the contradictory control of the Levels of Service is necessary with the aim of the monthly payments for the company. In that case, the mission of control defines the zones which will carry contradictory checks, according to the own observations of the ground. The role of the mission of control is also to make sure of the respect for the calendar and for the methods of work of the entrepreneur, to administer the administrative and financial aspects of the contract, to establish the reports of promotion, to receive works with the boss of work, and to train the staff of the administration in the field of the contracts for maintenance by levels of A year after the starting up of tthis project, first evaluations are very positive and the differences of this type of contract with the classic contracts are considerable. It is however still difficult to make economic comparisons with contracts for classic maintenance, in the sense where these new contracts take into account at the same moment works of rehabilitation and maintenance. It will be also desirable to analyze how companies echo risk on the proposed all-inclusive price. For the covering abstract see ITRD E135448.
Abstract