This paper develops a theory of safety based on economic and behavioral points of view. Drawing on examples from the nuclear power industry, it derives ten hypotheses. From economics, the hypotheses deal with the producer's ability to afford safety, the role government regulation plays in overcoming problems of imperfect information and limited liability, the decision a producer makes in allocating resources, and its production experience. From behavioral theory, hypotheses concern the organization's tendency to pay attention to goals sequentially, the impact past behavior has on current behavior, and the effects organizational strategies have on the attention paid to problems. Safety in the combined theory is the result of an organizational learning process wherein the organization must overcome routines and inertia to make safety improvements. Key aspects of the combined theory are the processes which make the organization aware of problems, the resources available to address these problems, and the ways the organization uses the resources to solve problems. The insights about organizational learning found in this paper can be applied to many industries besides nucklear and to many issues besides safety. Whenever organizations face unanticipated crises, the insights are of interest.
Abstract