FARE EVASION AS A RESULT OF EXPECTED UTILITY MAXIMISATION. SOME EMPIRICAL SUPPORT.

Author(s)
Kooreman, P.
Year
Abstract

In public transport systems with self-service fare collection passengers can decide whether to buy a farecard and pay the fare or not. A passenger who does not pay the fare is subject to a risk of being inspected and fined. This paper provides some empirical support for the hypothesis that passengers behave as expected utility maximisers. (Author/publisher).

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Publication

Library number
I 858198 [electronic version only] /72 / IRRD 858198
Source

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. 1993 /01. 27(1) Pp69-74

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This publication is one of our other publications, and part of our extensive collection of road safety literature, that also includes the SWOV publications.