The problem relates to the existence of yearly fluctuations in the incomeand expenditures of the infrastructure manager (IM). The influence of theIM on its income from rail access charges and State contribution is limited. In case a financial gap occurs, the IM is forced to delay planned maintenance actions, in particular renewals. Partnerships for railway maintenance should focus on developing a maintenance strategy and maintenance planning. These should be based on: state or regional policy regarding passenger transport and Public Service Obligations (PSOs). A shared view on the freight transport market and the function of the rail network on this market. Governments develop long term transport infrastructure plans (5-10 years). These policy plans include strategic choices of the Government with regards to financial support. These choices are also reflected in the (acceptable) level of access charges. The Governments policy is an essential reference for the IMs business planning. In order to make the partnership successful, it is essential to understand the IMs multi-annual business planning process. The building blocks of a multi-annual business planning are: market forecast (10 year period); tariff and revenue plan (5 year); plan for changes in network (5 year); long term global renewal and modernisation plan (>10 year); and renewal and modernisation plan (5 year). One of thekey barriers to MAC railway maintenance contracts is the apparent inability of the Government to commit budget resources for more than one year as has been stated by most of the interviewees. Several solutions are possible for this problem: e.g. definition of separate investment programmes, renewal programmes and operational maintenance funding. The contract needs tooperate with mechanisms to make sure all parties shall meet their contractual obligations. Contracts can be enforced by using incentive mechanisms and/or penalty mechanisms based on quality criteria. No uniform quality criteria are used in the EU at this stage. Lessons learned in the UK, Holland and Switzerland show that for a start only a few indicators, preferably also used in the old integrated railway, should be used: e.g. punctuality,a cost indicator like maintenance cost per train km, safety and presence of temporary speed restrictions and their duration. A multi-annual partnership should be evaluated and subsequently strategic plans for the future shall be decided upon. In case the IM owns the rail infrastructure, the possibilities of the State to terminate the partnership as a consequence of under performance are limited. One of the possibilities, in case only one IM is managing the rail infrastructure, is to re-assign part of the networkto another IM. Not every EU Member State is in the same position when it comes to the possibilities for implementing MACs on railway maintenance. Three main groups have been identified: (A) Principles acknowledged; (B) Transition phase; and (C) No multi-annual focus. For group A, the development of a network plan and its financing arrangements, output requirements regarding passenger and freight services and adjustment mechanisms that willbe used from year on year for the funding compartments are needed to takethe next step in the process. Countries in group B should provide necessary changes in order to enable translation of any State rail policy into a business plan and maintenance plan before a MAC can be achieved. The firststep for countries in group C is to start the multi-annual business planning process from the IM perspective and to start policy development from the perspective of the MoT. The target for this first stage can not be a fully fledged MAC but probably to arrive in group B. The road map for implementation shows that no one size fits all recipe for multi-annual agreements between the State and the IM exists. However, one has to conclude that in a lot of cases the planning mechanisms and contract agreements can substantially be improved. Nevertheless, one needs to acknowledge that in the end the level of investments in the rail network on capital work and maintenance remains a political choice. It would already be a step ahead if improved planning mechanisms could be reached, in order to make clear what theconsequences are of different maintenance budgets on the quality and sizeof the rail network. For the covering abstract see ITRD E137145.
Abstract