The aim of this report is to study the public utility if insurance companies were given access to extended information on the traffic behaviors of the insurant. The project consists of two parts, where the primary part aims at studying how the asymmetric information on risky behavior available to the insurance companies, affects the public utility. The aim of the secondary part is to study if increased information on risky behavior (traffic offenses) could create incentives for safer traffic behavior. If so, insurance companies could function as agents in fulfilling the visions of traffic safety politics. In analyzing the primary question, three questions are in focus: • Are individuals who have received fines or prosecution for traffic offences more prone to accidents where they have been partly or fully responsible, and are these individuals more likely to get a comprehensive insurance? • Does asymmetric information on risky behavior affect society and the insurance companies? • Are owners of sports cars more prone to risk taking in traffic, compared to owners of family oriented cars? In order to answer the secondary question, we study if the use of so called Usage-Based-Insurance (UBI) could facilitate for insurance companies to identify risky behavior. Using UBI, the insurance price is based on the usage of the car, that is, when and where the car is used, which would enable insurance companies to set prices according to driver behavior, rather than by using proxies of risk which are presently used. The report also discusses how a systematic transfer of information on earlier involvement in accidents and traffic offenses to a larger extent would enable for insurance companies to base insurance prices on the individuals traffic behavior. A pricing mechanism that aims at rewarding a safe traffic behavior could in the long run contribute to a decrease in the number of accidents. (Author/publisher)
Abstract