In this paper is presented part of the first phase of an effort in support of the virginia department of transportation's (vdot's) recently created antitrust monitoring and detection unit within the construction division. Provided are background on the legal aspects of anticompetitive market behavior and the recent experience with bidrigging in the construction industry. This paper is a companion to a paper in this record by allen and mills, "an economic framework for understanding collusive market behavior." The purpose of the work is to provide a framework for empirical studies of highway construction markets. The second-phase work will also support vdot in its evaluation of collusion detection models, the ultimate goal of which isto establish a comprehensive antitrust monitoring and detection system for use by the construction division of vdot. This report has three sections. The first describes major aspects of antitrust law that affect the highway construction industry. The second section is a summary of recent experience with bid rigging. The final section presents a number of proposals for hindering collusive behavior and detecting antitrust violations. This paper appears in transportation research record no. 1229, Economics, finance, planning, and administration.
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