Although the EC imposes many regulations on the rail systems of its member states it leaves some space for different approaches of rail organisation, which include much more than different degrees of vertical separation. This study aims to reveal key differences and similarities between the institutional and contractual set ups in the British, German and Swedish railsystems and the key interactions at the train operation/infrastructure interface. For a snapshot of the year 2007 the intention is to show what effects these differences have on the attributes (e.g. uncertainty) of key interactions and what really happens in practice at the interface. For this cross-national comparative study, more than 60 in-depth semi-structured interviews with train operating companies, their parent companies, infrastructure managers, regulators and industry associations were conducted. Key policy documents and contracts were also reviewed. From a methodological perspective, Williamsons transaction cost economics was applied to the trainoperation/infrastructure interface in seven pre-specified transaction/interaction areas (e.g. timetabling/slot allocation). The interviews focus onhow the interaction in each area works, including its frequency and intensity, as well as the uncertainty and complexity that are associated with it. Disputes as well as formal and informal dispute resolution procedures are considered. Unlike earlier studies regarding transaction cost economicsin railways this paper is not only interested in investment decisions in respect of rolling stock but is also trying to reveal the whole range of investment and coordination aspects associated with interactions between train operators and infrastructure managers. Although the focus is on track infrastructure, other assets such as stations, depots, rolling stock and human capital are also included in the analysis. The results show many commonalities (e.g. safety standards or timetabling issues) between the systems mainly because of the implementation of EU directives and the nature of the railways. Coordination and contractual aspects are seen as more crucial (the major source of disputes is around track possession for engineeringwork) than the traditional investment hold up or lock in issues and the importance of good relationships and trust is highlighted in all systems. Nevertheless the three systems are still very different, not only because of the increased heterogeneity and complexity of today's EU railways. The results indicate that the fully separated Swedish model aligns best to the transaction attributes although the relevant contracts within the Swedish system are still not entirely aligned to each other. The German model has clear advantages for the "DB family", and the British one is the most advanced one in terms of economics and completeness of contracts. The model ofvertical separation is seen as workable and best to provide non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure. For the effectiveness of implementation of EC policy it is, however, important to address also the effects of competition and contractual arrangements for each type of operation. For thecovering abstract see ITRD E145999
Abstract