At a level crossing accident on 16th June 2000 in the borough of Voorst, a family, consisting of father, mother, and three children, was killed. This level crossing was protected by an Automatic Flashlight Installation (AKI) which functioned properly. The driver of the vehicle, the father, probably did not see the AKI working in a complex traffic situation. There were other vehicles and a limited (over)view. Among other matters, the road signs on site were not optimal and, moreover, they hindered the view. A study of the local situation showed that the borough council of Voorst had, for years, been negotiating with the railway authority about removing level crossings and replacing them with grade separated junctions. These negotiations resulted in a deadlock, meaning that a number of dangerous situations could not be dealt with. The relationships, as found in Voorst, appeared to be typical for the management situation around level crossings. As commissioned by the Transport Safety Board, a study was made of the management, legal, and financial backgrounds. It appeared that the railway and road authorities are mutually dependant, without there being a competence to resolve deadlocks. The differences in problem perception between both parties are large, as well as the contrasts of interest. Although there have been considerable improvements concerning level crossings during the past few years, the Transport Safety Board is of the opinion that there are level crossings where, when a train is approaching, there is no control of whether it is clear of road traffic: it is either unprotected, an AKI, or an Automatic Half-Barrier Crossing (AHOB). These are an undesirable infringement of the general railway safety principle. The Board advises the Minister of Transport to: (1) ensure that the unprotected (St. Andrew's Cross) and automatically protected (AKI and AHOB) level crossings are replaced by grade separated junctions or by level crossings protected by an improved AHOB in which control is made of whether it is free of road traffic; (2) remove the management-legal bottlenecks dealt with in this report, for example by making óne of the parties responsible for ensuring that there is a safe traffic settlement (integral: railway and road). This party should receive sufficient funds and legal competence to carry out this task; and (3) to develop a law, or extend the new Railway Act, making it possible to implement a (to be developed) level crossing plan as quickly as possible, and with an as broad possible support from the parties involved.
Abstract