COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES (CBAS) OF POLICIES INTENDED TO INCREASE OCCUPANT RESTRAINT IN AUTOMOBILES TYPICALLY FIND THAT SUCH POLICIES GENERATE SOCIAL BENEFITS THAT EXCEED SOCIAL COSTS, OFTEN BY A CONSIDERABLE MARGIN. THE ANALYSES ARE INCOMPLETE, HOWEVER, DUE TO THEIR INABILITY TO INCORPORATE POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT COSTS AND BENEFITS THAT ARE HARD TO MEASURE AND MONETIZE. FURTHERMORE, ANALYSES FAIL TO ACCOUNT FOR DISTRIBUTION AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. DESPITE THESE LIMITATIONS, THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY THE OCCUPANT RESTRAINT CBAS TENDS TO BOLSTER THE CASE OF ADVOCATES OF MANDATORY PASSIVE RESTRAINTS AND OTHER RESTRAINT POLICIES. SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENTAL INVOLVEMENT CAN ALSO BE FOUND IN ECONOMIC THEORY, ALTHOUGH THE THEORETICAL CASE IS NOT NECESSARILY COMPELLING. THE PRINCIPAL LESSON OF THIS REVIEW OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE OCCUPANT RESTRAINT ISSUE IS THAT ANALYSIS CAN INFORM AN INJURY POLICY DEBATE, BUT IT CANNOT PROVIDE CONCLUSIVE ANSWERS, NOR CAN IT SERVE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.(Author/publisher).
Abstract