In 1994 the rail network of Deutsche Bahn (DB) was opened up to third parties against payment of access fees. During the last 9 years DB had to revise the access charging scheme four times. Against the background of several complaints on discrimination of non-DB track users and abuse of monopoly power by the vertically integrated incumbent company DB, the full institutional separation between track provision and train operation has been requested and has been extensively debated. This paper analyses the institutional framework conditions for network access and on-track competition from the point of view of economic theory and compares this to the current situation in Germany. Due to the fact that DB does not release any information on the number of competitors on DB tracks and on the train-km driven by them, data collection and interviews were used to update earlier studies by the author on the degree of on-track competition. The paper in particular identifies the obstacles for market entry of new rail companies and draws conclusions for the necessary regulatory framework. For the covering abstract see ITRD E126595.
Abstract