RECENTLY, HURST HAS ARGUED THAT ATTEMPTS TO REWARD SAFE DRIVING ARE LIKELY TO BE FUTILE. HOWEVER, HE ARGUES THAT EXISTING PUNITIVE SYSTEMS HAVE WITHIN THEM AN IMPLICIT REWARD STRUCTURE; PERSONS WHO DRIVE WHILE DISQUALIFIED ARE "REWARDED" FOR DRIVING SAFELY (I.E. THEY AVOID APPREHENSION) AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS REINFORCEMENT, SAFE DRIVING BECOMES HABITUAL. THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT HURST'S ANALYSIS MAY BE BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE MOTIVATIONAL EFFECTS INHERENT IN DISQUALIFICATION. THE BEHAVIOUR LEARNED WHILE DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION MAY NOT BE SAFE DRIVING, BUT RATHER PROFICIENCY AT AVOIDING APPREHENSION. SUCH A PROPOSITION HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR HURST'S FORMULATION INASMUCH AS THE MAJOR SOURCE OF "REWARD" WITHIN THE PUNITIVE SYSTEMS CONSISTS OF SATISFACTION GAINED IN SUCCESSFULLY BREAKING THE LAW. THIS PAPER DISCUSSES SOME NECESSARY PRE-CONDITIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MORE CONVENTIONAL REWARD STRUCTURES. (Author/publisher).
Abstract