The current conflict theory of emotion states that emotions arise at junctures of plans in which circumstances show the likely attainment or nonattainment of a goal and in which those circumstances include other plans and other goals. But emotions often arise from side goals rather than from the goal being aimed at. This article raises the question of what a goal is and suggests that any goal statement should include goals about a person's identity, self-definition, and cognitive development. This approach questions the sharp distinction usually drawn between goal and cognitive structure and puts forward a broader view of emotion as the awareness of important cognitive change that results from the validation or invalidation of one's cognitive system or a part of it. This view emphasizes the role of having a model of the self and shows how emotions can be defined as beliefs about changes in belief. This approach suggests that, just as pain monitors changes in physical states, so emotions monitor changes in mental states, providing high-level information for the management of cognitions. Another function of emotion is to identify the type and magnitude of inconsistencies between two mental states in a timely manner; such identification avoids the need for logical proof or numerical calculation. (A)
Abstract