Traffic conflicts between merging and through vehicles are typical phenomena near freeway on-ramp sections, yet few microscopic models describing the interaction of these vehicles in the merging process have been proposed. The interaction of these vehicles during the merging process are modelled under an enhanced game-theoretic framework. Freeway on-coming through vehicle and on-ramp merging vehicle are considered as competing players thatseek to maximise their respective rewards during the merging process. As the freeway vehicle aims to maintain its initial car-following state and minimize speed variations, the on-ramp merging vehicle strives to join mainline traffic in the minimal time possible subject to safety constraints. Considering the non-cooperative nature of the game, drivers at the merging section would eventually adopt strategies that form Nash equilibrium. To assess the model parameters, a bi-level estimation methodology is proposed with the upper layer as a least square problem and the lower level a linear complementarity problem searching for the equilibria. Application of theproposed model is examined and validated using trajectory data collected from the field. Testing results indicate that this framework can effectively capture vehicle interactions at freeway merging sections while achieving a relatively high accuracy of predicting vehicles' actions. For the covering abstract see ITRD E144727. Reprinted with permission of Elsevier.
Samenvatting