Traditionally, the risk averse traffic assignment is described by a game played between network users who seek minimum cost routes and demons that seek to impose maximum costs on the network users by damaging links on thenetwork. This problem assumes the presence of one and only one active origin destination (OD) specific demon in each OD pair, and furthermore assumes the capacity reduction to be 50% if the link is selected for damage by one or more OD specific demons. In this study, these two assumptions are relaxed and a multiple demon formulation in which each demon is free to select any link to damage is proposed. Numerical studies are carried out to examine the effects of relaxing the two assumptions on expected network cost, give an insight into the network demon behaviour in selecting links to damage, demonstrate the existence of multiple solutions to the proposed game, and compare the link selection behaviour of the OD specific and networkdemons and their impacts on expected network cost. Overall the results indicate the importance of the assumptions used to expected network cost andreliability measures, and provide some further insights into the nature of the route choice game. For the covering abstract see ITRD E144727. Reprinted with permission of Elsevier.
Samenvatting