On March 3, 1980, at 9:05 p.m., Pacific standard time, a sedan entered U.S. Route 101, (the Ventura Freeway) westbound from the Laurel Canyon on-ramp. It was traveling in the far right lane of the four-land roadway, changed lanes to the left, and collided with the right front of a gasoline cargo tank truck pulling a gasoline cargo tank trailer westbound in the adjoining No. 3 traffic lane. Both vehicles moved left and the tank truck sideswiped a westbound pickup truck in the No. 2 lane. The tank truck forced the pickup left into the median barrier. The tank trailer rolled over the median barrier, was ruptured, and its contents spilled and ignited. The pickup truck and the tank truck, with tank trailer, were destroyed in the fire. Of the seven occupants in the pickup, five died of thermal injuries and the other two were burned severely. The drivers of the sedan and tank truck received minor injuries. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the improper lane change by the driver of the sedan which hit the tank truck and caused it to move to the left and strike the pickup truck forcing it into the median barrier. The fatalities and injuries were caused by the fire which ensued immediately when gasoline was released from the ruptured tank trailer. RECOMMENDATIONS As a result of a special investigation of the emergency response following a March 31, 1977, railroad accident near Rockingham, North Carolina, the Safety Board concluded that "the implementation of an effective hazardous materials emergency response network in combination with adequate on scene communications should provide emergency response personnel with the information needed to adequately assess the dangers involved." As a followup of that special investigation the Safety Board made the following recommendation on September 13, 1979: to the U.S. Department of Transportation: “... develop and disseminate guidelines for planning emergency responses to transportation accidents involving hazardous materials. These guidelines should clearly delineate the on scene command structure, establishment of a command post and communications, and structure of the coordination of efforts, and require control of access to the accident site. Furthermore, the relationships and responsibilities of the responding Federal, State, Local and private agencies should be clearly identified. (Class II, Priority Action) (I-79-5)." The Department of Transportation endorsed the recommendation; however that recommendation has not been implemented. The Safety Board; therefore, reiterates that recommendation and urges prompt DOT implementation.
Samenvatting