Gaming-simulation has regularly proved to be a valuable method to explorefuture scenarios in various fields of policy-making. In this paper, the authors have applied gaming to examine the long-term consequences of contracting out the maintenance of roads to private players. The game, Road Roles, simulates at an abstract level the new situation in liberalized markets- where instead of traditional prescriptive contracts more long term andperformance oriented contracts are used which cover a whole road network in periodic maintenance. The change from traditional prescriptive contracts to contracts where the contractor decides which section, when and what kind of work he will perform, with the condition of keeping a certain levelof performance for a whole road network for a certain number of years. The article explains how it can contribute to understanding the consequencesof this liberalization, how it was set up, and presents the results from 14 different sessions that were held in Holland, Finland and Spain. Three most characteristic and colorful game-runs have been highlighted and described in more elaboration. It appears that strategic or opportunistic behavior plays a very substantial role during the tendering and implementation process of liberalized road maintenance markets. The role of the road agency, and especially its anticipation of contractor behavior and subtlety inadministering specifications and incentives for 'good' and 'bad' behavioramong contractors is key in averting perversities and a decline in road quality. Many agencies, but not all, seemed to fail in this important mission.
Samenvatting