The response to fines and probability of detection in a series of experiments.

Bar-Ilan, A. & Sacerdote, B.

The authors used traffic data from a series of experiments in the United States and Israel to examine how illegal behavior is deterred by various penalty schemes and whether deterrence varies with age, income, driving record and criminal record. They found that red light running decreases sharply in response to an increase in the fine or an increase in the probability of being caught. The elasticity of violations with respect to the fine was larger for younger drivers and drivers with older cars. Drivers convicted of violent offenses or property offenses run more red lights on average but have the same elasticity as drivers without a criminal record. Within Israel, members of ethnic minority groups have the smallest elasticity with respect to a fine increase. (Author/publisher)

Publicatie aanvragen

5 + 9 =
Los deze eenvoudige rekenoefening op en voer het resultaat in. Bijvoorbeeld: voor 1+3, voer 4 in.


20111734 ST [electronic version only]

Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 2001, 42 p., ref.; NBER Working Paper No. 8638

Onze collectie

Deze publicatie behoort tot de overige publicaties die we naast de SWOV-publicaties in onze collectie hebben.