Inverse (or reverse) Stackelberg games have become the subject of recent game theory research, as a special type or as an extension of Stackelberg games. So far, only very little theory about inverse Stackelberg games is available and the available theory is still in its infancy. In this thesis we focus on theoretically solving such problems and we propose to treat several challenging problems in various fields inside this framework. In Stackelberg games a so-called leader determines actions for one or more so-called followers. The problem of finding an optimal strategy for the leader in these games is in general extremely hard to solve, and often even completely unsolvable. Starting from simple static problems and proceeding to more difficult dynamic ones, we show how to find the optimal strategy for the leader in a heuristic manner. In this thesis, the application of game theory is proposed in the following domains: The optimal toll design problem, the electricity markets liberalization problem, and the theory of incentives. (Author/publisher)
Samenvatting