The Commission’s inquiry UK Transport Safety: Who is responsible? was into the legal framework and institutional responsibilities in the UK for safety of transport by air, rail, and road in the UK. Responsibilities for safety in aviation and rail transport are well established and the Commission through this inquiry has no recommendations concerning safety in these modes. The small number of deaths in rail and air transport over a period of years contrast sharply with an average of nearly five per day on the UK’s roads. The Commission heard that the level of risk we face on the roads would not be tolerated in aviation, railways or, for that matter, in the workplace. There needs to be a long, hard look at our present arrangements for roads to take advantage of learning from the experience in the rail and aviation sectors and in the road safety management practices of other leading countries. The historical successes in reducing road casualties have not happened by chance but through the assiduous activity of the Department for Transport (and its predecessors), local highways agencies and other governmental effort. The work of the private and voluntary sectors has also been crucial. But we cannot rest on our laurels and progress in the future will become progressively harder unless our current fragmented arrangements are improved. The complex structure of responsibility for safety in the case of roads is far from transparent to the public and professionals alike. It is hardly surprising that accountability and leadership in road risk management can become diffuse. The rail and air transport safety regimes are based on a systems approach with a strong emphasis on safety management by the system providers and operators. We recommended that all authorities adopt a systems approach and pursue road casualty reduction towards goals within a recognised risk management system which allows for the measurement, targeting and monitoring of outcomes. This will actively and coherently address shortcomings in the road system, in vehicles, in user behaviour and in the care of people injured in collisions. The Safe System is such an approach that has gained international acceptance and is described in an Appendix. To achieve further significant casualty reduction and safe active travel requires re-establishment of clear leadership at national government level. The lack of a coherent approach across government departments is also seen at the local level. We are concerned that in recent years those bodies with the relevant roads responsibilities may have become distracted, particularly by the difficulties of dealing with fiscal austerity and a view that national road safety targets are no longer necessary. The rise in road casualties in 2014 — against the long-term trend of year-on-year reductions — shows that casualty reduction cannot be taken for granted. We call for adequate, dedicated resourcing for road safety, at the least returning to levels that prevailed between 1987 and 2009. We recommend restoring the capacity of those with current statutory responsibilities. The funding levels for air and rail safety and the sum recently awarded to Highways England for additional safety measures on the strategic network demonstrate that additional funds could be found for road safety on local roads. Currently there are no national casualty reduction targets for local roads in England. The balance of opinion we received was strongly that national targets are helpful and necessary. We recommend that national Government sets ambitious targets for casualty reduction on the path towards zero deaths and serious injuries. Target setting needs to be grounded on sound analysis informed by the underlying principle of making risks as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) and underpinned by intermediate outcome targets and indicators which can be adopted by local government and other responsible bodies according to their road safety and other travel objectives. The greatest influence on preventing death and serious injury is through design of roads and vehicles, and better speed management. But measures that engage directly with road users and effect behaviour change through enforcement, education and campaigning are also needed. If we are to continue to drive down casualty numbers there needs to be leadership in enforcement, education and campaigning, demonstrated publicly through placing an emphasis on shared responsibility among the different system providers as well as personal responsibility. Some road transport activities involve higher levels of risk and these users would like to feel safer, regardless of casualty statistics: cyclists, parents of young children and of young drivers, older drivers and motorcyclists are examples. Making active travel — walking and cycling — less risky and so more attractive would have major health and environmental benefits. This can be achieved by increasing action to reduce actual risks and to improve the accuracy of the perception of risks for all vulnerable road users in order to encourage safe active travel. In implementing its commitments made in September 2014 the Ministry of Justice should make sure that all victims of road traffic crime benefit equally with victims of other crimes from their implementation. The number of deaths resulting from road travel in the course of work greatly exceeds the number occurring in the workplace. We are disappointed by the approach of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in this vital area of workplace safety. HSE’s priorities do not include work-related road safety. We recommend that the HSE changes policy so that employers have to report when someone has been injured whilst using the road for work or when someone driving or riding for work injures a member of the public. This and other measures would help ensure these injuries are managed and investigated consistently with those injuries sustained in a fixed workplace. Arrangements for accident investigation vary. The air and rail sectors have similar arrangements with specialist, dedicated accident investigation bodies. There is total separation from any relevant regulatory or operator body as it is to these that the majority of safety recommendations are directed. However they are not necessarily the only investigation into an accident and legislation allows for parallel (but separate) investigations including the judiciary. Accident investigation is focused on learning and is separate from any prosecution (which may still proceed). The reports are compiled in a consistent format, published and usually acted upon. It is different for roads. Road collisions resulting in death are investigated, but not necessarily from the right point of view for the understanding of causes. The police investigate to establish whether an offence has been committed and the highway authority investigates to establish whether there has been a failure of the road infrastructure. The HSE might investigate to see if health and safety law has been breached but in practice this rarely happens. Coroners investigate road deaths (and others including deaths in aviation and rail accidents) to establish the cause of death. They may produce Reports to Prevent Future Deaths which can include recommendations for action. They may be advised by technical safety experts but the process is not comparable to that of an investigation in aviation or rail. The investigation procedures are not standardised; findings from these investigations are not sufficiently accessible; the responsibility for responding to recommendations is not clear; and arrangements for corporate learning of the lessons are not adequate. Responsibility for acting on the findings needs to be clearer and more comprehensive. The collection, interpretation and dissemination of data and information is vital to our understanding of what works and, at least as importantly, what does not work so that avoidable harm is not imposed upon workers and members of the public. Good quality and accessible information is the bedrock that supports better decision making. In roads the UK has a long and excellent research record. But research and learning, like transport and health, are global activities and whilst the UK output is highly regarded there is much to be learned from international good practice and example. This has been recognised in the health sector where Public Health Observatories have been set up to provide a single gateway to a vast range of high-quality and trustworthy public health intelligence, expertise and support for practitioners, policy makers and the wider community. Their expertise lies in turning information and data into meaningful health intelligence whereby they can act as a learning network. Professional experts and the victims of drivers breaking traffic laws feel strongly that there needs to be better transparency and completeness of process and data relating to road crime. We support this. There is need to support better knowledge transfer including synthesis and dissemination of safety research reports and briefings from across academia, government departments, the three main transport modes, the third sector, and from the various bodies in health, police, and insurance companies. Further progress requires better professional mobilisation to improve governmental understanding of the factors leading to death and serious injury on our roads and ways of mitigating the consequences. Presently there is an uncoordinated patchwork of effort across government to understand these factors and we need to know in what ways a re-allocation of effort might be productive, or what the return might be from changing the way we do things. Whilst independent investigation of individual incidents in rail and air is a vital part of the riskmanagement process, on its own it is not enough. The institutional arrangements aim for an overall understanding of the context and what the systematic study of individual incidents can tell us about the properties of the whole system. In the context of roads, police investigations and coroner’s reports are valuable, but the difficulty in abstracting the lessons contained within them make them less productive than they could be if they were digested by a single co-ordinating body. We believe the systematic principles, practice and follow up which are used in the investigation of air and rail accidents should be applied in appropriate ways to road collisions. In particular, there needs to be a learning process which is kept separate from any criminal investigation. We recommend the creation of an advisory body for road safety independent of government to provide continuity of knowledge and be an authoritative source of expertise, dissemination, advice and intellectual leadership in risk management in road use. Road collision investigation could be a function it supervises. The high frequency of incidents is no excuse for failing to be systematic. We do not envisage that it would have executive or enforcement powers. It would not necessarily supplant any existing activities or responsibilities. It would achieve results by establishing itself by reputation for analysis and argument; an impartial, advisory body to which executive authorities look to and respect. The safety investigation authorities in the air, rail and marine sectors liaise and share learning. We recommend that the head of any road accident investigation body is a member of the Chief Accident Inspectors Board. Further consideration is necessary to determine an appropriate scope and scale of activity and cost. However, we reject any simplistic objection that this proposal would cost money at a time of austerity unless it can be demonstrated that this new body would be unlikely to achieve a commensurate saving of death and injury. There is so much to be done and so much to gain that we think that unlikely. (Author/publisher)
Samenvatting